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Near East and South Asia Review

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**Near East and
South Asia Review**

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Pakistan's Air Force Modernization Program

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Pakistan will probably buy the Chinese F-7 fighter, Beijing's version of the Soviet MIG-21, to replace its obsolete Chinese-built F-6s, but the new aircraft will have only a marginal impact on the air balance with India because of New Delhi's own modernization program.

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Sri Lanka: Colombo's New Security Initiatives

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President Jayewardene appears to have given priority to a military response to violence from militant Tamil separatists, but, even with new troops and materiel, the military is not likely to be successful because of poor discipline, increasing insurgent strength, and growing Tamil resentment.

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Ismail Khan—A Unifying Force for Resistance in Western Afghanistan?

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Since 1979 Jamiat-i-Islami leader Ismail Khan has built one of the largest and most effective insurgent organizations in western Afghanistan, but, because of his Tajik heritage, he is unlikely to become more than a regional resistance commander.

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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the authors,

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Articles

Israel: Perceptions of Jordan and the PLO

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Israeli leaders are closely watching the maneuvering between Jordan's King Hussein and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. Many Labor Party leaders view Hussein's decision to act as host to the recent Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting and his efforts to convince the PLO to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242 as evidence that he is positioning himself to enter peace negotiations with Israel. Nonetheless, almost all political leaders doubt that Arafat will ultimately accept Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations with Israel or give Hussein the "green light" to negotiate on the Palestinians' behalf. As a result, Prime Minister Peres is concerned that Hussein's efforts to woo Arafat will complicate Peres's own strategy on the peace process and expose him to criticism from Vice Prime Minister Shamir and other Likud leaders, who believe Hussein will not enter talks on terms Israel can accept.

effort to win PLO endorsement of UN Security Council Resolution 242 as part of his strategy to create more favorable conditions for his entry into peace negotiations. They believe Hussein is attempting to exploit internal PLO divisions to gain Arafat's agreement to Hussein's proposal for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian framework for negotiations. In their view, Hussein probably calculates that Arafat's position has been so weakened by the PLO's internal feuding that he will eventually have to give in to Jordanian demands.

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Israeli officials also are deeply concerned that rapprochement between Jordan and the PLO could lead to a growing PLO presence resulting in increased terrorist attacks against Israeli and West Bank targets from Jordanian territory. They believe the return of large numbers of PLO personnel to Jordan and greater legitimacy accorded the organization could gradually lead to a loosening of Jordanian control over PLO activities, despite the best intentions of the Jordanian Government and security establishment.

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What Is Hussein Up To?

Hussein's decision to allow the PNC to meet in Amman in late November surprised Israeli officials. Most Israeli leaders regard this action and Hussein's

Israeli Reactions to the PNC

Labor Party officials were bolstered in their hope that Hussein could be a potential participant in peace talks. They believe the meeting strengthened King Hussein's standing on the West Bank and among moderate Arab countries and increased the PLO's dependence on Jordan. In Labor's view, the very convening of the PNC revealed Syria's inability to dictate policies to the Arab world and leaves

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Damascus with no effective political options for continuing its struggle against Arafat. [REDACTED]



Israeli leaders were not surprised that the PNC did not accept Hussein's proposal for a joint PLO-Jordanian initiative based on UN Resolution 242. They believe that, despite Arafat's desire to improve relations with Amman and Cairo, Arafat is more interested in leaving open the possibility of reconciling with the major Palestinian groups in the Democratic Alliance, the largest PLO component after Arafat's Fatah, and eventually with Syria. As a result, Arafat wants to avoid early decisions on the peace process that might spark new PLO infighting. [REDACTED]

Dilemma for Peres

Prime Minister Peres doubts that Hussein's strategy on the peace process will succeed. Embassy and media reporting indicates Peres does not believe Hussein can either split the PLO's ranks or gain its approval to allow Jordan to represent the Palestinians in the peace process. Peres is concerned that, by reaffirming the legitimacy of Arafat and the PLO, Hussein will reduce his leverage on pro-Jordanian Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and make it difficult for Israel and Jordan to engage even in behind-the-scenes dialogue. [REDACTED]

Peres also is concerned that Hussein's strategy will expose Peres to attacks from political opponents at home who are watching his every gesture to West Bank and Gaza residents and Jordan. Peres's own strategy on the peace process has been to avoid bringing it to the attention of the Cabinet, but to

exploit the resources of his office and the Defense Ministry to encourage Palestinian and Jordanian participation in negotiations. Peres is looking for signals from Hussein that Jordan is interested in negotiations to bolster his case for a more flexible Israeli policy should the issue of peace talks be brought before the Cabinet. Peres is concerned that Hussein's efforts to draw the PLO into negotiations—which is a nonstarter for Israelis—strengthen the view held by Likud and some Labor ministers that Israel should not adopt a more conciliatory approach to peace talks and that the “Jordanian option” is not viable. [REDACTED]

Debate in parliament on the PNC meeting revealed the fundamental differences between Likud and Labor approaches to negotiations with Jordan that could threaten coalition stability if the peace process is revived. Peres responded to the PNC in a statement to the Israeli parliament appealing to Jordan to begin direct talks with Israel without preconditions and criticized the PLO for rejecting UN Resolution 242. He repeated his government's willingness to negotiate with a mixed Jordanian-Palestinian delegation but reaffirmed Israel's opposition to PLO participation. [REDACTED]

Vice Prime Minister Shamir presented Likud's hardline position on the peace process. Shamir reiterated the Israeli public's consensus that the PLO is committed to Israel's destruction and warned that Israel would strike at terrorists at every opportunity. He also counseled Jordan and Egypt that support for the PLO and support for peace are incompatible. Shamir said that, if Jordan wished to advance the peace process, it should give up its dream of forcing Israel to return to the 1949 armistice lines. [REDACTED]

Israeli Security Concerns

Israeli officials are worried that a Jordanian-PLO rapprochement will lead to a growing PLO presence resulting in increased terrorist activities from Jordan against targets in Israel and the West Bank. Defense Minister Rabin and other Israeli leaders warned Amman after two Katyusha rockets were apparently fired from Jordanian territory in early November that

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Israel would not tolerate an upsurge in rocket attacks or terrorist infiltration attempts from Jordan. Only three rocket attacks from Jordan occurred over the past three years. [redacted]


efforts to cultivate pro-Jordanian moderates on the West Bank. Peres also wishes to remind Hussein that PLO participation in the peace process is unacceptable to Israel. [redacted]

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Israeli

officials do not believe Jordan will allow the use of its territory as a base for terrorist attacks against Israel in exchange for Arafat's agreement to Hussein's strategy on the peace process. They are nonetheless worried Arafat will outmaneuver Hussein and that their rapprochement could lead to a loosening of Jordanian control over the PLO apparatus in Jordan despite Amman's best intentions. [redacted]

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Outlook

Israeli officials will continue to watch closely the Jordanian-PLO accommodation for signs of a weakening of Jordan's resolve to prevent terrorist activity against Israel. No Israeli government can tolerate infiltration attempts or rocket attacks from any source without responding in some fashion. Should Israeli leaders determine that a terrorist incident—especially one that results in a loss of lives—was mounted from Jordan, Israel probably will retaliate against PLO targets in Jordan regardless of whether Amman had prior knowledge of the terrorist planning. Israeli warnings to Amman are intended to prod Jordan to redouble its antiterrorist efforts. [redacted]

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At the same time, Israeli warnings to Amman probably are intended to limit Hussein's flexibility in his talks with Arafat. In our judgment, Peres is signaling to Hussein that Israel will not stand by if, to conclude a deal with Arafat, Hussein offers to allow PLO activities in Jordan to expand to the point that they threaten Israel's security or undermine Israeli

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Israel: The Kahane Phenomenon

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Rabbi Meir Kahane's election to the parliament last year shocked most Israeli political pundits, who assumed that his Kakh party's avowedly racist platform would not appeal to the electorate. Kahane's party garnered only a little over 1 percent of the ballots cast, but recent public opinion polls indicate that Kahane's support has grown significantly since the election. Israeli political parties, including the hardline Tehiya-Tzomet, have remained critical of Kahane's politics and insist they will not include him in any government coalition. If Kahane's electoral support continues to grow, however, Likud and its rightwing allies may have to choose between abandoning their principles or forfeiting the chance to form a right-of-center government—which would require Kahane's support—should the current national unity coalition collapse.

Who Is Kahane?

Rabbi Kahane first immigrated to Israel in the early 1950s, but he returned to the United States after failing to find adequate employment there, according to Israeli press reports. Kahane came to Israel to stay in 1969. In 1973 Kahane formed the Kach party and began his quest for a seat in the parliament.

In the election of 1973, Kahane won over 12,000 votes, putting him within striking distance of the 1 percent threshold necessary to gain a parliamentary seat. In subsequent elections, however, Kahane's popularity dipped. He failed to attract more than 6,000 votes in either the 1977 or 1981 elections.

Despite his waning electoral fortunes, Kahane kept his name on the front pages by organizing numerous demonstrations in support of settlements and by advocating that Palestinians leave the occupied territories and pre-1967 Israel. Kahane was arrested several times, and in 1980 he served a six-month prison sentence for plotting attacks against West Bank Arabs.

The 1984 Election

Kahane's unexpectedly strong performance in last year's election—he won 26,000 votes—was due in large part to his popularity among Sephardi Jews, who comprise almost half of the Israeli electorate. Although he received only a scattering of votes from the Tel Aviv area and other regions where Ashkenazi Jews predominate, the Kakh party performed well in Sephardi strongholds, including:

- 3.3 percent of the vote in the smaller development towns.
- 2.7 percent of the vote in Jerusalem's poor neighborhoods.
- 2.6 percent of the vote in moshav settlements where Sephardim are the majority group.

In addition, Kakh took over 3 percent of the votes cast in religious moshavim, 2.5 percent of the military vote, and 5 percent of West Bank settler votes.

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Polling results are not yet available detailing why Israelis who supported Kahane chose to do so. Analysis of the election results indicates, however, that parties to the right of the Likud Bloc, such as Kakh and Tehiya-Tzomet, benefited from dissatisfaction among Likud supporters. Almost all of the rightwing parties' gains in the election came at the expense of Likud.

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Kahane made no attempt to mask his views during the election campaign, and Israelis who voted for Kakh apparently supported his extremist positions. Kahane's main theme was that Arab citizens of Israel, who comprise approximately 14 percent of the population, should either be encouraged to leave Israel or made second-class citizens. Kahane argues that the growth of the Arab population, both inside Israel and in the occupied territories, will eventually threaten the Jewish nature of the Israeli state. He claims that there are inherent contradictions among

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Judaism, Zionism, and democracy and that, if it becomes necessary, democratic principles should be sacrificed to preserve the Jewish state. []

The Political System Reacts

After the election last July, Israeli political parties and leaders put distance between themselves and Kahane. President Herzog, breaking precedent, refused to meet with Kakh representatives during his discussions with political leaders on the formation of a new government. Likud announced that it would not invite Kahane to join a coalition government. Even Tehiya-Tzomet, which ideologically is closest to Kakh of any political party, publicly criticized Kahane. []

In a move clearly directed at Kahane, Likud and the Labor Alignment stated in their coalition agreement that they would introduce legislation against racism. Kahane's victory also led Israeli political leaders to speculate again about electoral reforms that would prevent small parties, such as Kakh, from winning representation in the parliament. []

Israeli institutions also acted to limit Kahane's influence. The Israeli Broadcasting Authority, concerned that Kahane was receiving undue media attention, decided to limit coverage of his actions and announced it would not cover statements by him that violated the principles of the Israeli Declaration of Independence. Kakh's support within the Israel Defense Forces so disturbed the military leadership that the Chief IDF Education Officer announced the institution of special courses for soldiers on democracy and the dangers of racism. []

In December the parliament voted 58 to 36 to curtail Kahane's immunity. Members of the parliament normally enjoy extensive privileges that have made it difficult for the police to prevent Kahane from provoking Arab unrest. The parliament's decision allows security forces to limit Kahane's freedom of movement. Most Likud members either abstained or voted with the minority. []

Kakh and Jewish Terrorism

Despite Kahane's extreme views, Kakh has not been identified as one of the principal organizers of Jewish terrorist attacks against West Bank Arabs. The major group associated with the Jewish terrorist

underground that has been accused of attempting to bomb Arab buses last year and was implicated in the car bombings of West Bank mayors in 1980 is Gush Emunim. Gush Emunim is a religious, prosettlement organization that shares Kahane's zeal for retaining the occupied territories but is linked politically with Israel's religious parties, particularly Morasha and the National Religious Party. []

In a separate incident, however, five Kakh members were arrested for a shooting attack last year on an Arab bus traveling in the West Bank. In addition, Yehuda Richter, the number-two man on the Kakh election list, recently received a five-year prison sentence for setting Arab cars on fire. Kahane has publicly disassociated Kakh from these attacks, claiming that the organization does not encourage such activities because of the "risk of getting caught and arrested." []

According to the Israeli press, Kakh has no more than 200 dedicated members, and Kahane apparently prefers to employ his supporters in activities calculated to increase Arab tensions and provoke Arab violence. In recent weeks, for example, Kakh has sent letters to prominent West Bankers, such as Bethlehem's Mayor Frayj, urging them to leave the occupied territories to prevent "terrible developments." After the murder of PLO Executive Committee member Fahd Qawasmah, Kahane and his Kakh supporters attempted to celebrate his death in Hebron, Qawasmah's hometown. Armed with the new authority granted them by the parliament, the police intervened and forestalled Kahane's plans. []

Kahane's Support Grows

Despite the Israeli political leadership's attempts to rein in Kahane and the controversy associated with his activities, Kakh's support has continued to increase. Polling results released in November indicated that Kakh would receive three parliamentary seats in a new election, and the most recent polling data award Kakh five seats. []

These polls also show an increase in Labor's support and a precipitous decline in Likud votes. Kakh and Tehiya-Tzomet are the two principal beneficiaries of

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Kahane reacts to police decision preventing him from entering Arab village.

probably accounts for a good part of his appeal. At the same time, however, Kahane's presence in a coalition would significantly strain relations between Israeli Arabs and Jews and further restrict Likud's limited flexibility on the peace process.

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Likud's decline. Some Likud supporters apparently are disenchanted with the party's participation in the national unity government and are backing parties, such as Kakh, that they believe have not compromised their positions. The survey results, however, do not indicate an overall increase in Israeli support for right-of-center parties.

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Israeli political observers have learned through experience to be wary of polling results, particularly when elections are several months or years away. If the national unity government endures until 1986, when Foreign Minister Shamir would become prime minister, support for Likud probably will grow at the expense of both Labor and the rightwing parties.

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Nevertheless, if Kahane retains even some of his new supporters, it will become increasingly difficult for Likud and its allies to form a right-of-center government without having to rely on at least the tacit support of Kakh. Kahane's participation in a government could tarnish his renegade image, which

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Pakistan: The Pakistan People's Party Braces for Elections [REDACTED]

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The Pakistan People's Party remains Pakistan's most popular party, but it is in serious disarray because its leaders cannot agree on a strategy for the impending national and provincial assembly elections. Some want to boycott the nonparty elections, while others urge participation. The PPP's problems are magnified by a growing divergence between the party's Sind and Punjab factions. President Zia has worsened the party's problems by cultivating and co-opting key leaders, particularly in Punjab Province. [REDACTED]

The Leadership Vacuum

Never a cohesive party, the PPP became more unsettled after its founder, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was overthrown in July 1977 and executed in April 1979.¹ Bhutto neither tolerated rivals nor groomed a successor. Leadership passed to his widow, Nusrat Bhutto, who became chairman of a 12-member steering committee, but she proved ineffective. Her influence declined after she left Pakistan for medical treatment in London in 1982, but she remains the titular head of the party. [REDACTED]

The PPP has never resolved the leadership issue. Three figures have emerged as major contenders: Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi—a major actor and Sind PPP president; fellow Sindhi Benazir Bhutto—the Prime Minister's exiled daughter who appeals most strongly to Sindhis and to the PPP's left; and Farooq Leghari—a leading Punjabi moderate who resigned as PPP secretary general in June, probably to position himself to deal with President Zia. [REDACTED]

Zia has exploited the power vacuum by negotiating with individual PPP chieftains. His approaches have fostered rivalries and suspicion among PPP leaders and diverted them from adopting a comprehensive party strategy. A widening divergence of interest between the party's Punjab and Sind wings also

hampers it. [REDACTED] prosperity in Punjab Province since Zia took power has undermined support for the PPP. Many local stalwarts have concluded that they must reach an accommodation with Zia, arguing that rivals will benefit from any vacuum that their continued opposition to Zia creates. The failure of most Punjabi leaders to actively support the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy's anti-Zia civil agitation campaign in 1983 or its boycott of the recent presidential referendum clearly points to a reluctance to take on Zia.² One party official has estimated that 70 percent of party members in Punjab would participate in nonpartisan elections if permitted. [REDACTED]

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The situation is more complex in Sind Province.³ Excluding Sind's two major cities, Karachi and Hyderabad—dominated by non-Sindhis who have never supported the PPP—the party has benefited from growing popular bitterness against the Punjabi rule that Zia symbolizes. But, unlike Punjab, the PPP's major opposition in Sind comes from the left whose leaders are even more hostile to Zia and increasingly advocate separatism. Although PPP-led boycotts of the local elections in 1983 and the recent national referendum were effective in rural Sind, their lack of national success has caused some prominent PPP Sindhis to reconsider opposition to Zia. [REDACTED]

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² The PPP is the dominant member of the MRD—a loose coalition of center and left parties united only by their opposition to Zia. The PPP's relations with other MRD members frequently have been stormy and have contributed to the MRD's lack of success against Zia. [REDACTED]

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Responding to Zia

The major issue confronting PPP leaders is whether to acquiesce in Zia's controlled return to civilian government or to challenge him by leading an election boycott.⁴ A civilian government under Zia is likely to exclude the party from a direct role in government. Zia has compounded the PPP's dilemma by sending out conflicting signals. He has condemned all parties and called for nonparty elections. Privately, however, Zia has extended feelers to some PPP chieftains, causing many to hope that they would be allowed to run if they limited party agitation.

PPP moderates had been offered the right to participate if they acknowledged the legitimacy of Zia's government. The politicians would also be required to accept constitutional amendments creating a National Security Council to give the military a voice in political affairs and augmenting the President's powers.

Benazir Bhutto Still Militant

Bhutto's exiled daughter that she could return to Pakistan if she told party members not to organize a boycott. Benazir has been trying to organize opposition from the United Kingdom. Zia would "disqualify" all PPP members if the party decided to boycott.

We believe Benazir will not accept Zia's terms. She told US diplomats her party would win two-thirds of the vote in a fair election and interprets the low turnout in the referendum as a demonstration that the people are ready to reject Zia. Her view, however, is not supported by a recent opinion poll conducted in Pakistan. According to the poll, the PPP is the most popular party in Pakistan but only by a 24-percent plurality. Moreover, 49 percent of those responding said the PPP was the party they disliked most.

Nonetheless, Benazir insists that Zia's efforts to co-opt leaders in the PPP and the MRD will fail and that a boycott can succeed. She reasons that Zia needs

elections to legitimize his position, particularly with junior Army officers and enlisted men, and that, if the PPP can hold out, he will eventually be forced to concede the party a role in national politics.

In July, Benazir issued a nine-point manifesto. Major demands included:

- A general amnesty for all political prisoners.
- Removal of the ban on political parties and activities.
- Elections and transfer of power to the largest party.
- Unrestricted participation in the elections.

Benazir followed up in September threatening to expel any party member who participates in the elections.

Benazir's ability to make good her threats is doubtful. Although she enjoys sympathy as the heir to a popular martyred leader and her opinions continue to command weight, she acknowledges difficulty communicating to her followers from exile. Moreover, her ability as an organizer is suspect. Benazir is losing the support of Punjabi party leaders who grumble because she is too close to exiled party radicals and will not denounce her brothers' terrorist activities. These politicians argue that Benazir is out of touch with the mood in Pakistan and that the government can exploit her radicalism to discredit PPP moderates.

The Jatoi Angle

Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi is an uncertain factor. His power base is in rural Sind, where his only effective rival is Benazir.⁵ Recent diplomatic reporting indicates Jatoi may be building support in Punjab. Punjabi politicians tell US diplomats that 15 months in detention enhanced Jatoi's political stature as did his firm statements since his release opposing Sindhi separatism. Some are saying that they will look to Jatoi for guidance on the boycott issue.

⁵ Mumtaz Bhutto, the former Prime Minister's cousin and Jatoi's strongest remaining rival in Sind, was expelled from Pakistan in early November. His departure removed the PPP's most prominent leftist and supporter of Sindhi nationalism.

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Jatoi [redacted] private conversations with US diplomats suggest that a deal is possible. Jatoi told officers of the US Consulate General in Karachi that the 1973 Constitution is not sacrosanct—a position contrary to that held by Benazir Bhutto. Unlike the Bhutto women, Jatoi would be willing to assure Zia and the Army that no one would be prosecuted for deposing Prime Minister Bhutto. He has indicated he is prepared to accept the redistribution of power between the President and Prime Minister [redacted]

Sind, the majority of Pakistanis—including those who are politically active—are not willing to take to the streets to unseat President Zia. In the face of such public apathy, we believe that the most the PPP can accomplish would be to disrupt elections in some Sind districts and tarnish the elections' credibility. In our judgment, another defeat of the PPP by Zia would accelerate the disintegration of the party and could provoke a final split between its Punjab and Sind wings. [redacted]

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Jatoi asserts that the crucial questions are who will be allowed to participate in government and the powers of the assembly. He has said that, if the assembly functions as a truly representative body, he would not object to Zia's continuation as President, notwithstanding his condemnation of the referendum, and he would be willing to run in nonparty elections.

Jatoi maintains that the threat of a boycott is the PPP's best bargaining tool. [redacted]

[redacted] A major purpose of his recent trip to Lahore was to persuade Punjabi party members to end public statements favoring participation in elections because such statements undercut his leverage with Zia. Jatoi is under growing pressure from second-echelon PPP leaders in Sind, however, to work out a deal so that the PPP can participate,

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We doubt that Jatoi and Zia can resolve their differences on the distribution of power in a civilian government. Accordingly, we expect Jatoi to lead a boycott of the assembly elections. Jatoi is also constrained from compromising by the risk of an open break with Benazir Bhutto, with whom he still confers and whose views continue to carry weight in Sind. [redacted]

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Jatoi, as the champion of a PPP-led boycott, would confront Zia with a serious but manageable challenge. PPP divisions will persist, and we doubt that Jatoi can carry most Punjabi leaders with him. [redacted]

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Outlook

The popular mood in Pakistan is difficult to judge, but the available evidence suggests that, except in rural

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Pakistan's Growing Oil Industry

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Pakistan's small but growing oil industry has already met all the major goals of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, which was scheduled to run through June 1988. Domestic production has doubled over the past year and should be able to meet about a fourth of Pakistan's petroleum needs in 1985. Increased domestic production and continuing price weaknesses in world oil markets are helping hold down expenditures on imports. We believe this record gives weight to the government's hopes for petroleum self-sufficiency by the end of the decade.

The Setting

Pakistan in 1983 was faced with both oil shortages and the prospect of rapidly increasing expenditures on oil. Hundreds of factories had been forced to shorten their hours during the winters of 1981 to 1983. Domestic production was only 13,000 barrels per day (b/d), about 10 percent of total oil needs. Oil imports had tripled in value during the previous five years. Payments for imported oil were equal to half of all earnings from exports.

The World Bank noted that Pakistan's oil consumption was high relative to economic activity, even for a developing country. Each 1-percent rise in GDP was associated with a 1.4-percent rise in the quantity of imports of oil and oil products in the period FY 1979-83.

The Plan

Energy in general and oil in particular were stressed in Pakistan's Sixth Five-Year Plan for FY 1983-88. (The plan was abandoned in November 1984.) Production was planned to increase by over 60 percent to 21,000 b/d, and conservation measures including changes in work hours and energy audits were to be implemented. All planned production was to come from accelerated development of existing wells, but increased exploration was also proposed. The World Bank called the production goals realistic but predicted that the extremely optimistic exploration

Targets for Oil and Gas in the Fifth and Sixth Five-Year Plans

	Public Sector	Private Sector	Total
Fifth Five-Year Plan (FY 1979-83)			
Exploratory wells	5	20	25
Development wells	15	42	57
Total	20	62	82

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Sixth Five-Year Plan (FY 1983-88)

Exploratory wells	38	54	92
Development wells	58	100	158
Total	96	154	250

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goals could be met only if the government's Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC) was strengthened, private-sector incentives improved, and prices of alternative fuels rationalized. The plan provided for pipeline construction and investment in existing refineries but did not provide for construction of new refineries.

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Improvements in the oil sector have been guided by Mohammad Assad Khan, who became Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources in October 1983. Embassy sources say Assad Khan, who holds a doctorate from Harvard in geophysics, is dynamic and apparently highly competent technically.

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Achievements and Prospects

The plan's production goal for June 1988 was exceeded in October 1984 when production reached 24,000 b/d. We believe additional wells have come on line since then, adding a few thousand b/d.

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Fifty wells were drilled in the plan's first year. Ten new fields, significant by Pakistani standards, have been found. Four tested in the range of 2,200 to 4,000 b/d, another at 12,000 b/d, and yet another in the range of 15,000 to 20,000 b/d. Not all wells are fully operational, and production will increase as they go on line. Exploration in a promising offshore area in the Gulf of Kutch claimed by both India and Pakistan could add another issue to the two countries' already troublesome relations. Reserves are estimated at 70 million barrels, modest by world standards but adequate to allow increased production for the foreseeable future. []

Pipeline and refining capacities have not expanded as rapidly as drilling capacity and constitute a bottleneck. These imbalances result from the fact that production levels achieved in 1984 exceeded the planned levels for 1988. One field capable of producing 6,000 b/d was producing 2,000 b/d because not enough trucks were available to truck crude to a refinery. There are plans to lay a pipeline from the fields in the Badin District to the refinery in Karachi. []

The OGDC has become more efficient. Operators consider the contract terms favorable and the working environment excellent. We believe that oil usage will increase as prices of alternative fuels increase. The World Bank has required Pakistan to eliminate gradually the substantial subsidies that made its natural gas prices among the lowest in the world. []

Consumption has increased even faster than domestic production. In FY 1984 crude oil imports increased 0.9 percent by volume; lower prices, however, meant that their value fell 8.7 percent compared to FY 1983. Imports of petroleum products increased 21.3 percent by volume but decreased 0.5 percent in value. Currently, imports are 90,000 b/d of crude and 30,000 b/d of petroleum products. No effective conservation measures have been implemented. Until they are, consumption is likely to grow more rapidly. []

Foreign Funding and Participation

The discoveries, coupled with Khan's positive approach to foreign companies, have led to increases in foreign funding and investment. Although the World Bank has reduced its funding of oil and gas

projects 40 percent worldwide for FY 1984, it provided Pakistan with \$51.5 million for oil exploration and \$30 million for development, making it the only country to have both kinds of funding. []

The US firms Occidental Petroleum and Union Texas are heavily involved in all aspects of the industry from exploration to production. They operate in all promising areas of Pakistan. Canadian firms are also active in both exploration and drilling. Ottawa has made substantial grants for exploration and training. The technical superiority of Western firms is clearly preferred, but equipment from Communist countries is accepted when Western alternatives are not readily available. []

Pakistan also gets oil help from the Communist nations. Moscow's current participation is at a low level, but it was scheduled to deliver two rigs in January. Agreement in principle has been reached with Romania to fund construction of a refinery with a capacity of 3.5 million tons per year. Further negotiations on this deal may have taken place earlier this month when a joint Pakistani-Romanian ministerial commission met in Islamabad. []

As the risk associated with drilling has diminished, Pakistan has tried to obtain better contract terms from foreign nations. It now grants concessions for three years as opposed to the previous eight to 12 years. Drilling must begin within 18 to 24 months, and those holding idle concessions are being asked to surrender them. The Pakistanis are also beginning to ask for partnerships in the new wells. Western companies are resisting these demands, fearing that flexibility will be lost if power has to be shared with Pakistani bureaucrats. []

The OGDC is now insisting that, whenever possible, rig parts be produced in Pakistan, and Islamabad has expressed a desire to purchase oil rigs. The World Bank opposes rig purchases since experience in other countries shows a tendency for less developed countries to become "rig driven" and engage in uneconomical ventures to keep rigs in operation. The Bank sees continued rig leasing from multinational corporations as "far preferable." []

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Pakistan's Air Force Modernization Program

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Pakistan will probably buy the Chinese F-7 fighter, Beijing's version of the Soviet MIG-21, to replace its obsolete Chinese-built F-6s. The F-6s account for half of the Air Force's 300 planes. Pakistan is also considering buying advanced Western fighters such as the Mirage 2000, the F-20, and additional F-16s to replace the F-6, but their higher cost will probably discourage large-scale purchases. Purchasing new aircraft will have a marginal impact on the air balance with India because of New Delhi's own modernization program.

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Replacing the F-6

Pakistan embarked on a major Air Force modernization program in 1981 when it bought 40 F-16s, but it still needs to replace 150 aging F-6s to keep pace with the Indian Air Force, which has increased its inventory of advanced Western and Soviet aircraft. The F-6, the Chinese version of the Soviet MIG-19, is based on 1950s technology. The Indian Air Force currently holds a 2-to-1 numerical advantage over Pakistan. It has about 300 MIG-21s, most of which have been recently manufactured, and about 90 advanced MIG-23 fighters and 40 advanced British Jaguar fighter-bombers. Pakistan's leaders consider India's increased ability to strike Pakistani military facilities, airfields, supply lines, and industrial targets to be a key threat to the country's security.

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The F-6s in the Pakistani inventory are an increasing maintenance problem, and only about half of the F-6s are normally operational.

Aging airframes and electrical systems are increasing the number of F-6 air crashes and reducing readiness,

only about half the F-6 engines can operate for 100 hours before they have to be overhauled. In contrast, the Soviet MIG-21—the most numerous aircraft in the Indian Air Force—usually operates for 300 hours before overhaul.

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Considering Options

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Pakistan has displayed considerable interest in the Chinese F-7. Pakistani pilots flew the F-7 several times in 1984 in Pakistan. The Chinese F-7 is cheap, has better air defense capabilities than the F-6, and is easy to maintain. The Chinese have sold newly manufactured F-7s to Egypt and North Korea for less than \$4 million per aircraft and have provided military equipment to Pakistan.

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
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NESA NESAR 85-003
18 January 1985

SecretChinese F-7 

Jane's ©

The F-7 can carry more weapons and has greater speed than the F-6, and British avionics incorporated by the Chinese into the aircraft enhance its capability to identify and target enemy aircraft. The F-7 can be equipped with heat-seeking missiles already in the Pakistani inventory.

The Mirage 2000, US-built F-16s, and F-20s are more capable fighters than the F-7 but are more expensive. India paid about \$37.5 million each for 40 Mirage 2000s in 1984, and Pakistan paid about \$28 million each for 40 F-16s in 1981. Maintaining the Western aircraft would be more expensive and difficult because of their more advanced technology.

Outlook and Implications

We believe that Pakistan will choose the F-7 primarily because of its relatively low cost. Islamabad would seek to replace its F-6s with Western aircraft only if it were to receive major foreign financial assistance. Pakistan, however, may buy a small number of advanced Western aircraft.

India's qualitative as well as quantitative edge over Pakistan in fighter aircraft will increase in the 1980s. The Indian Air Force is acquiring Mirage 2000s and Soviet MIG-27s and MIG-29s to augment its already substantial inventory of MIG-21s, MIG-23s, and British Jaguars. These advanced aircraft outperform the F-7. The Indian Air Force's numerical advantage also will increase from 2 to 1 to 2.5 to 1 unless Pakistan purchases more aircraft than the amount needed to replace the F-6.

Pakistan's purchase of the F-7 will reinforce the already strong political ties between Islamabad and

Table 2
Comparison of Major Fighter Aircraft

	Maximum Bomb Load (pounds)	Combat Radius With External Fuel ^a Intercept Mission/HLH Attack Mission ^b (nautical miles)	AI ^c Radar Range (nautical miles)	Maximum Speed
F-6	1,100 (500 kg)	320/180	1.1 (ROR) ^d	1.4 Mach
F-7	2,200 (1,000 kg)	300/250 ^e	10 (ROR)	2.1 Mach
Mirage 2000	11,200 (5,100 kg)	900/750	54	2.2 Mach
F-20	6,300 (2,900 kg)	750/550	30-39	2.0 Mach
F-16	10,600 (4,800 kg)	1,100/750	25-40	2.0 Mach

^a MIL-C mission rules applied.

^b Assumes a 2,000-lb bombload (1,000 lb for F-6).

^c Airborne intercept.

^d Range-only radar. Such radars do not have the ability to search and are much less capable than an AI radar.

^e Assumes the latest produced Chinese version of the F-7.

Beijing, in our view. Chinese technicians will help with the training of the F-7 pilots and technicians. China will sell spare parts and weapons and will help with the more difficult maintenance problems during the operational lifetime of the F-7. Air Force officials will exchange information about the plane's performance.

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**Sri Lanka: Colombo's
New Security Initiatives** []

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President Jayewardene appears to have given priority to a military response to violence from militant Tamil separatists. The military has stepped up recruiting efforts, ordered new coastal patrol ships, and restructured command procedures to stem further communal violence. Colombo is also likely to seek additional foreign military support to contain the Tamil insurgency. Even with new troops and materiel, however, the military is not likely to be successful because of poor discipline in the ranks, increasing strength and sophistication of the insurgents, and growing resentment of the Army by the Tamil community. []

Military Maneuvering

Sri Lanka's three military services have become increasingly involved in countering the insurgent threat over the last 18 months. They are being enlarged and restructured to respond better to the task. []

[] notes that the government is making an aggressive effort to upgrade military equipment in all branches. Colombo has increased the military's budget to step up the purchase of foreign arms and obtain anti-insurgency training. Automatic rifles have been purchased from Belgium and the United States, and a range of ammunition has been acquired from China and Singapore. These acquisition efforts are frequently sabotaged by graft and corruption within the ministries responsible for implementing military expenditures. []

Since communal riots swept the country in July 1983, Colombo also has sought to expand its Navy. The Navy recently purchased three old ships from China to use as "mother ships" in the Palk Straits to support interdiction efforts between India and Sri Lanka.

[] Colombo is seeking 16 small patrol boats, probably from China.

[]

[] they hope to buy 25 additional small boats from the United States. Special allowances were given to the Colombo dockyards in August 1984 to begin building indigenous coastal defense ships for the Navy. []

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In early December all branches of the security forces—Army, Navy, Air Force, and national police—began major recruiting campaigns designed to increase the overall force level by more than 10 percent. According to Colombo's government-controlled press, thousands of applicants flooded recruiting offices. We believe the military lacks the necessary infrastructure, however, to train and integrate large numbers of new recruits into existing units. []

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[] the Navy will soon reorganize geographically. Plans call for the creation of four regional commands. The primary goal is more effective prevention of insurgent movements into the country from India. There are too few career Navy commanders, however, to fill the proposed new slots.

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The Army will move its base of operations into the northern districts in late January to emphasize Colombo's commitment to suppress communal violence in that region, according to Sri Lankan press reports. Four new Army camps will be created in district capitals in the north to coordinate better the Army's control of the region. []

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Civilian Security Preparations

Colombo has created two new civilian ministries ostensibly to improve citizen response to communal violence. According to press accounts, one ministry will safeguard critical industries and resource allocation in the event of further communal turmoil,

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while the other coordinates the use of manpower, including recruitment and training of volunteers for civil defense programs. []

Although the new agencies are likely to improve security in Sri Lanka, we believe the creation of the ministries also indicates:

- Jayewardene's desire to reduce the public prominence of his Minister of National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali, whose political fortunes have been rapidly improving during the nine months he has headed the ministry. He is now acclaimed the most likely successor to Jayewardene.
- A new sense of resignation among Sinhalese leaders that containing the Tamil insurgency will involve a long-term effort. []

Colombo has created a system of civil defense units in the capital and plans to extend the program to other major urban areas in the Sinhalese south. Government officials allege that Tamil insurgents are increasingly striking at civilian targets to create panic in Sinhalese areas and that civilians must help in their own defense. Civilians are being organized into armed units to protect their immediate neighborhood in times of ethnic violence. []

Official accounts in the government-controlled press of Colombo's new civil defense initiatives have been accompanied by an upsurge in racist rhetoric. The Minister of National Security has used the historical example of the medieval Sinhalese King Dutugemunu to rouse volunteers to come to the aid of the country. No Sinhalese could miss the overtones of resisting the Tamil "invader," or pushing back the "Indian menace," in the references to King Dutugemunu. Jayewardene himself has called on Sinhalese youth to come forward to "crush the Tamil threat." Such language blurs the distinction between the militant Tamil extremists who threaten the unity of the country and other Tamil citizens who seek an end to the violence. []

Security Shortfalls

Colombo's attempts to increase security capabilities through stepped-up military recruitment and civil

defense will not greatly reduce the threat from Tamil insurgents. In fact, such efforts are likely to:

- Lead to increased insurgent strikes against civilian targets as Tamil separatists seek to demonstrate Colombo's impotence.
- Further offend moderate Tamil leaders.
- Increase the widespread Sinhalese perception that all Tamils are enemies of the state. []

Colombo has cited the allegedly successful recruiting efforts as evidence that the military is more committed to containing the Tamil insurgent threat, but we believe the Sri Lankan military has several major problems that will continue to prevent it from being an effective anti-insurgent force. All three services are plagued by poor training and chronic indiscipline, which seriously reduce their effectiveness. Recurrent acts of violence by government forces against defenseless civilian targets have convinced Tamils throughout the country that there can be no discussions with the central government until the military is brought under control. Following the death of a Sinhalese soldier in the first week of December after an insurgent attack on a convoy, soldiers billeted near the scene went on a rampage, killing more than 100 Tamil civilians in the neighborhood. []

The Army, which is most deeply involved in responding to insurgent attacks, is severely limited in its ability to respond to communal conflict. It is overwhelmingly dominated by Sinhalese. Army units rotated to the north for short tours of duty tend to be isolated from the population they are to protect not only by language and culture, but also by commanders who are encouraged to restrict their troops to the immediate vicinity of their bases to prevent them from becoming targets for the insurgents. []

We believe Colombo has serious doubts about the military's ability to maintain domestic order. Jayewardene has asked for military assistance from neighboring states twice in the last month—for Gurkha units from Nepal and infantry from Bangladesh—not from any lack of Sinhalese recruits

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but because Colombo is growing more unsure of the effectiveness of Sinhalese troops against Tamil insurgents in the north and the continuing unwillingness of Sinhalese to serve in Tamil areas. So far, Colombo's requests have been denied. Dhaka and Kathmandu do not want to jeopardize relations with New Delhi. [REDACTED]

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Outlook for US Involvement

Colombo's recent security measures fall short of what would be necessary to subdue the militants and further complicate political negotiations between the government in Colombo and the Tamil insurgents in the north. Jayewardene is likely to claim that until the Tamil insurgents are suppressed, there will be no further opportunity for political negotiations. [REDACTED]

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The President may point to the recent increase in insurgent activity and the failure of political negotiations as evidence that the country needs to turn again to the United States or United Kingdom with requests for substantial military aid. Colombo's government-controlled press, often used by Jayewardene to float ideas prior to government policy changes, has already begun to describe last month's visit by Ambassador Vernon Walters as a preliminary to increased US support for the country's antiterrorist program. [REDACTED]

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Ismail Khan—A Unifying Force for Resistance in Western Afghanistan?

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
Since 1979 Jamiat-i-Islami leader Ismail Khan has built one of the largest and most effective insurgent organizations in western Afghanistan. Soviet and Afghan forces, despite repeated efforts to clear the Herat area, have failed to suppress Ismail's fighters and have suffered high casualties. Ismail's efforts to provide civilians with essential services through an organized insurgent administration have increased his popular support and may prove important to the long-term survival of resistance in the west.



Ismail Khan

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The Leader



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Civilian Support

Ismail's followers claim he is a unifying force for the regional resistance movements.

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Civilians in Herat, who have been among the strongest supporters of the insurgents, respect Ismail's organizational skills and his successes against Soviet and Afghan forces. Moreover, they are predominantly Sufi, and Sufism emphasizes support for a single leader.

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Ismail began his role in the resistance in the Herat uprising in 1978 when he led some of his troops from the Afghan 17th Division against forces loyal to the Communist regime. After the unsuccessful uprising, he spent four months in Golran and contacted the Jamiat-i-Islami in Mashhad, Iran, before returning to Herat, Badghisat, and Ghowr Provinces to build the resistance. He then went to Peshawar, Pakistan, and received recognition from the Jamiat-i-Islami. He was elected head of the Herat Jamiat-i-Islami in 1980.

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Civilians view Ismail as friendly, low-key, and approachable. He has taken care in his military planning to protect the lives of civilians and has established schools and hospitals in the Herat area. Ismail has redistributed some land and, because Soviet reprisals would damage fields and insurgents are needed for agricultural work, seldom orders attacks when harvests are due.

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Growing Insurgent Organization

Ismail's insurgent organization has grown substantially since 1979. It is now the most powerful and influential of Jamiat-i-Islami groups in western Afghanistan.

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Unlike many other regional insurgent leaders, Ismail is respected for his political as well as military acumen. He offers an alternative form of administration to civilians who find the Babrak regime and the feudalism of some insurgent leaders unacceptable—an important element in the long-term survival of the resistance.

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NESA NESAR 85-003
18 January 1985

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Ismail has expanded his base from Herat City, and his guerrillas now operate throughout Herat Province and in Badghisat, northern Farah, and parts of Ghowr. Insurgent groups in western Afghanistan directly controlled by Ismail or loosely affiliated with him include at least 25,000 and possibly as many as 35,000 men. [] Ismail claims to have at least 5,000 insurgents under his direct command in Herat City and about 10,000 more in the rest of the province. []

Ismail is the political and military head of the Herat Jamiat-i-Islami organization. []

[] the province is divided into subdivisions for administrative purposes, each with its own shura (council) authorized to tax civilians, run the schools, adjudicate, and build food stockpiles for emergencies as well as a mobile force to ensure that the shura's orders are carried out. []

[] the organization also includes four councils at the provincial level: Executive, Military, Provincial, and Urban. Ismail and his deputy Alawuddin Khan serve as the highest ranking members on each council. Most of the other representatives on the councils are former Army officers loyal to Ismail and who command groups at the local level. The Executive Council is the central governing body, and the Military Council serves as the focal point for strategy at the provincial level. Financial, religious, agricultural, and medical issues are addressed by the Provincial Council. Representatives from some 75 Jamiat committees in Herat City—each with 20 to 50 armed insurgents—meet on the Urban Council to coordinate the offensive planning of the insurgents that operate in the city. []

Ismail has increased his efforts to foster cooperation with other insurgent organizations—especially other Jamiat groups—in the western provinces and maintains contact with resistance leaders in other parts of the country. [] he has formed military alliances with groups in Badghisat, Farah, and Ghowr and occasionally assists insurgents in operations in Faryab Province. Moreover, Panjsher Valley commander Masood and Ismail have exchanged some personnel. Ismail's organization has tolerated smaller non-Jamiat groups

in the area. []

Insurgent Operations

Ismail's insurgents—divided into small, comparatively well-trained mobile groups—have become increasingly aggressive since 1979. In response, the Soviets have launched frequent multibattalion-size operations. We estimate that the Soviets and Afghans have conducted at least 15 large sweeps during the past year to relieve insurgent pressure on the city and major roads in the Herat and Shindand areas. The Soviets and Afghans have suffered relatively high casualties, but, [] resistance losses have also been high. []

The insurgents repeatedly cut the roads leading to the Iranian and Soviet borders, and ambushes of Soviet convoys between the border city of Towraghondi and Herat and Shindand to the south have obliged the Soviets to tighten security. []

[] The Soviets have constructed a series of military posts along the road to provide additional safety and have increased the size of columns. Nonetheless, the guerrillas continue to strike convoys moving through the area and now also attack the small military posts, especially between Herat and Eslam Qal'eh on the Iranian border. []

The Jamiat insurgents in Herat have successfully denied the Soviets control over the city for the past five years and most likely will continue to prevent the Soviets and their Afghan allies from establishing more than temporary ascendancy in the provincial capital. Repeated Soviet and regime sweeps through the bazaar have failed to prevent insurgent groups from reestablishing positions or maintaining constant pressure on Afghan posts in the city. A Soviet and Afghan sweep through the city in June resulted in intense fighting and high civilian casualties but failed to dislodge the insurgents. A cordon-and-sweep operation southwest of Herat in September apparently was of only limited effectiveness, and the Soviets and Afghans launched a new operation against the resistance in December. []

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The absence of Soviet positions in Herat City has facilitated the high level of guerrilla operations. US Embassy sources report that Afghan troops usually are reluctant to leave their posts in the city. At night, the guerrillas move frequently through regime areas.

[redacted]

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[redacted] The resistance also conducts frequent assassinations and arrests of government sympathizers in the city,

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[redacted] US Embassy sources report that in mid-December the guerrillas killed over a dozen KHAD (Afghan intelligence) officials. [redacted]

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A chronic shortage of weapons and ammunition hinders some of the insurgents' activities. [redacted]

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[redacted] in mid-1983 Iran began to block arms supply routes to insurgent groups that refused to affiliate with pro-Iranian resistance organizations in western Afghanistan. Ismail, who had been using routes through Iran to resupply his forces, now depends heavily on captured arms supplies. [redacted] Ismail claims to receive only 50 percent of his weapons from Peshawar; the other half comes from Soviet and regime depots in the Herat City area. Between early 1983 and early 1984, Ismail's insurgents staged 11 successful raids on munitions warehouses [redacted]

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[redacted] stealing large amounts of weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies [redacted]

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Outlook and Implications

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Aided by his ability to organize his forces and plan and implement successful operations, Ismail's insurgent organization probably will continue to deny the Soviets long-term control of the Herat area despite resupply problems, occasional tensions with smaller, rival organizations, and the lack of substantial support from Iran. Resistance in the western provinces—fired to a large extent by religious fervor—is likely to grow. Area insurgent groups probably will continue to cooperate under Ismail's leadership. Because of his Tajik heritage, however, he is unlikely to become more than a regional resistance commander. [redacted]

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